Cost-Benefit Analysis, Discounting, and the Environmental Critique: Overloading of the Discount Rate? by Angelsen, Arild
Cost-Benefit Analysis, Discounting,
and the Environmental Critique:





Department of Social Science and Development
ISSN 0803.0030
Cost-Benefit Analysis, Discounting,
and the Environmental Critique:









of the Discount Rate?
Arild Angelsen
Bergen, November 1991. 54 p.
Summary:
The use of (high) discount rates in cost~benefit analysis is being criticized in the
environmental debate. In paricular, some feel that high futur environmental costs do not get
a fair hearng in a project appraisal due to the use of high discount rates. This paper explores
first the relationship between the discount rate and environmental degradation. The link is
ambiguous, though the overall effect of a lower discount rate may be more environmental
friendly policies. Secondly, we discuss factors which should determine the discount rate
according to economic theory, and to what extent environmental considerations can be brought
into this framew.ork. Finally, the paper briefly reviews other ways of bringing environmental
considerations in the analysis, e.g. taking risk, uncertaInty and ireversibilty into account and
including sustainabilty constraints. The conclusion is that the present tendency of overloading
the discount rate should be avoided.
Sammendrag:
Bruken av (hØy) diskonteringsrate i nytte~kostnadsanalyser er blitt krtisert i miljØdebatten. Det
hevdes bL.a. at store miljøkostnader i fremtiden ike blir tilstrekkelig tatt hensyn til i
prosjektvurderinger dersom diskonteringsraten er for høy. I denne rapporten undersøkes først
sammenhengen mellom diskonteringsraten og miljøforrngeIser. Selv om denne sammenhengen
ike er entydig, vil en lavere rate i de fleste tilfeller føre til mer miljøvennlige beslutninger.
Deretter diskuteres faktorene som ifølge økonomisk teori bestemmer diskonteringsraten, og
hvorvidt miljøhensyn kan trekkes inn i dette oppsettet. Til slutt vurderes andre måter å bringe
inn miljøhensyn i prosjektanalyser, som f.eks. ved å trekke inn risiko, usikkerhet og
irreversibiltet, og ta hensyn til begrenset bærekraft. Konkusjonen er at en bør søke å unngå
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1 Introduction1
It is time for a serious reappraisal of the Government' s policy on
discounting costs and benefits in the evaluation of public policies,
programmes, and projects (Lind, 1990).
The discount rate used in a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is critical for the
social profitability of projects or policies with large environmental impacts.
Many people feel that potentially large or even catastrophic environmental
consequences in the future, do not get a "fair" hearng when we discouht
these costs to present values. We ignore our grandchildren, or at least we
ignore them by 10 per cent per annum.
The aim of this paper is to survey some of the relevant literature and
theories for a discussion of the environmental critique, and how
environmental considerations could be inc1uded in an economic assessment.
The emphasis is on general mo dels and concepts; we do not for instanee go
into the discussion on how the "correct" rate should be estimated in
practice. To some extent, we shall relate the discussion to the particular
situation in developing countres.
Chapter 2 elaborates the environmental critique raised against discounting
in CBA. This critique is based on the assumption that a lower rate would
pro mote environmental conservation. Chapter 3 discusses this relationship,
and shows that the effect of a lower discount rate is ambiguous. As the
environmental effects frequently are related to long term costs and benefits,
a lower discount rate would give these higher present values. However, a
lower rate could also make investment projects with negative environmental
impacts more acceptable.
We discuss three possible ways of including environmental considerations
into an economic assessment. The first one is to lower the discount rate in
order to give higher weight to future environment al costs and benefits. As
the effect of a lower discount rate is ambiguous, even though the overall
effect on environmental quality may be positive, this alternative would not
be a very precise means. But in order to conclude as to whether the rate
should be adjusted, one needs to discuss the rationale behind discounting
in economic theory. This is done in chapter 4, which explores whether
within the theory there may be any arguments for lowering of the discount
1 The present report is a slightly expanded version of apaper presented at the 13th
Research Meeting for Norwegian Economists in Bergen, 7-8 Januar 1991. I would like
tothan colleagues at CMI for useful comments on draft versions of the paper.
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rate in the presence of large environmental effects. The conc1usion is that
the fact that a project may have negative environmental impacts is not an
argument, per se, for using a lower discount rate. Indirectly, however, the
sum of negative impacts on the environment may lower future economic
growth, which implies lower social discount rates. Secondly, the rationale
for pure time preference is questioned, paricularly when it comes to
decisions significantly affecting the well-being of future generations.
A sec ond way to include environmental considerations in the CBA would
be to extend the traditional method, which in the formal analysis has given
very limited attention to environmental impacts . Ways of extending the
traditional approach are reviewed in chapter 5, where emphasis is put on
risk and uncertainty, and how this should be handled. Uncertainty
associated with environmental costs and benefits may also give an argument
for adjusting the discount rate. A third possibility would be to introduce
additional or alternative criteria into the analysis. Chapter 6 discusses two
possibilities in this respect, viz. sustainability constraints and the Safe
Minimum Standard approach. The main conclusions are summarzed in the
final chapter.
2 The environmental critique of discounting
The importance of the discount rate for the assessment of future costs and
benefits is illustrated by a simple example. Consider a toxic waste that may
have catastrophic consequences in a 100 years time. Suppose the probability
of this catastrophe occurrng is 10 per cent, and that the cost would then be,
in today's prices, $ 1 billion. The expected cost then becomes $ 100 milL.
U sing a discount rate of 5 per cent per annum, the present value of the
expected costs will be $ 760 449. But if we double the discount rate to 10
per cent, the present value becomes only $ 7 257. This shows how
significant future costs may be reduced to next to nothing through the
discounting proeess. Secondly, it also illustrates the sensitivity on the
present value by changing the discount rate. When the costs appear 100
years from now, reducing the disco unt rate from 10 to 5 per cent increases
the present value more than 100 times. This has led some to label this
feature the "tyranny of discounting".2
A number of environmental groups and environmentally concerned
individuals argue that the discount rate should be lowered in order to giv e
2 For example, Pearce et al (1989) use this term. They do not, however, agree with the
environmental critique of discounting.
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future, negative environmental effects proper weights in the decision
making proeess. Sandra PosteI of the WorldWatch Institute writes, in "an
artic1e on a new 'eco' -nomics", that "among the first priorities is to make
public investments place more weight on the future rather than
systematically undervaluing it. One solution is to lower the discount rate to
a level doser to the real rate of capital productivity, around 1 to 3 per cent"
(PosteI, 1990, p. 26). Others have also suggested to use a lower rate. In the
United Kingdom, for example, the Treasury uses a speciallow rate of 3 per
cent for afforestation projects, whereas the normal rate is 5 per cent.3
Others have gone further and argue that for certain resources or
environmental effects one should apply a negative disco unt rate rather than
the normal positive one (Goodin, 1982 and Hall, 1990). The arguments
have been of different kinds. One is to lower the rate in order to adjust for
risk and uncertainty related to environmental effects; another is to lower it
to reflect the fact thatenvironmental goods will be increasingly appreciated
and valued by the population, parly because these goods will become
increasingly scarce, and pary because environmental goods seem to be
increasingly demanded by higher income levels.4 These arguments are
definitely valid and should be taken into account in the analysis, but it is
not obvious that lowering the discount rate is the appropriate way of doing
this.
There is, however, a third argument, which raises much deeper issues
concernng the basic assumptions in welfare theory. This critique against
a uniform discount rate in the analysis is based on a rejection of the
assumption that (all) environment al goods can be substituted for other
goods, and that they therefore should be treated separately by a different
discount rate. Goodin asks whether the assumption of smooth substitution
between all goods in the welfare function holds. "Were everything reducible
to monetar equivalents, everything would have to be discounted the same
way. ... If, on the other hand, not everything is cashable in terms of
everything else, then the case for uniform geometrcal discounting of all
goods fails to follow" (p. 60). The essence of the argument is that there is
3 See Pearce et al (1989) chapter 6 for a discussion.
4 This is to say that the income elasticity for environmental goods is higher than 1. Cooper
(1980) notes that "this supposition seems plausible enough, at lea 
st in those cases where
environmental damage is not an immediate theat to basic matters like food and shelter"
(p. 71). When the latter is the case, as in many developing countries, there is little
meaning in talking about high income elasticities.
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an important c1ass of "non-tradable" goods5 which can be discounted only
in their own terms.6 Goodin refers to human life as perhaps the best
example of a non-tradable good. But, he also notes that most goods are not
tradable over theirentire range. There exists some minimum quantity and
quality of certain goods that we would in sist on before we are willing to
enter an exchange for any other goods, "breathing opportunities" being an
example.
This critique questions the "choice-value thesis" of neo'-c1assical
economics (Broome, 1978). The neo-c1assical assumption that all goods in
principle are commensurable, can be traced back to Aristotle' s statement
that "all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable". By
judging from the choices and trade-offs we make, one can implicitly assign
values to the different goods.7 This critique raises new issues, and we shall
not go further into this discussion.
In summar, we may distinguish between two separate views: The first
is that the discount rate should be lowered generally in order to put more
emphasis on future environmental effects. The second suggests a lower rate
be used for certain environmental costs and benefits (resources). In what
follows, we shall mainly concentrate on the first. The latter raises deeper
issues regarding the philosophical foundations of welfare theory and CBA.
As the framework for discussion below is within this (neo-c1assical)
paradigm, it cannot be used to judge the validity of the second view.
5 The meaning of this term should not be confused with the way it is used in the theory
of international trade.
6 This argument is similar to one presented by Georgescu-Roegen (1954). Re writes that
"it has long since been observed that human needs and wants are hierarchized. ... ths
hierarchy is the essenee of any argument explaining the principle of decreasing marginal
u til t y" (p. 513). This hierarchy of wants makes him conclude that all human wants
canot be reduced to a common basis. Re introduces the "Principle of the Irreducibility
of Wants" , and regrets that this have escaped the attention of neoclassical economists.
This observation is stil valid, almost four decades later.
7 Broome (1978) underlines that "when two alternatives are incommensurable, they are not
made commensurable by the mere fact that people can choose between them" (p. 62).
Goodin (1982) similarly concludes that "we may make a choice between nontradable
goods if we were forced to choose. But the fact that we do choose does not, under these
circumstances, prove that we have been fully compensated for the loss in one good by
the gain in another. This being the case, any trade-off infonnation or common metrc of
value derived from such forced choices should not be used in trading one of the goods
for another whenever the opportunity arses. It may properly be used only when the trade
is inevitable, and we are forced to make a hard choice" (p. 62).
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3 The influence of the discount rate on enV'ironmental
degradation
3.1 A purifcation project
The fundamental role played by the discount rate in cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) is to put costs and benefits in different years into a common unit of
measurement: the present value. A positive net present value (NPV) is a
necessar condition for accepting the project. The NPV has become the
main measure of a projects economic value, even though one may find
other criteria.8
As projects most often only differ in degree in their environmental
impact, it is hard to define, and it gives liule meaning to talk about
"environmental projects". Instead, we shall discuss the impact on the
environment of discounting for some relevant groups of project. We first
consider a simple purification project, aiming to reduce the emission of a
harmful waste. For simplicity and to illustrate the main points, we assume
continuous time and infinite time horizon. The investment costs equal 1.
The environmental benefits (EB) from the project are constant over time.
The NPV of this project is
(3.1) NPV = -1 + Joot=o EB e-it dt = -1 + EB/i
Should this project be implemented? As (3.1) shows, the answer is crucially
dependent on the discount rate: The higher the discount rate is, the lower
the NPV, which goes asymptotically towards -1 as i goes towards infinity.
The NPV will be negative for any i ~ EB. For rates lower than EB the long
term environmental benefits outweigh the early investment costs.
This simple case illustrates one important characteristic of the economics
of environmental problems. A project to dean up the environment is
typically characterized by costs occurrng now, whereas the benefits due to
enhanced environmental quality come later. This time-lag between the costs
and benefits is essential for the understanding of the economics of the
pollution problem.
8 There are also other criteria like the internal rate of retum (IRR), the benefitlcost ratio
and the payback period. None of these are, however, satisfactory from a theoretical view.
The most serious competitor to the NPV -criterion is the IRR. The main disadvantage of
this is that for mutually exc1usive project altematives the IR-criterion wil not
necessarly select the project that gives the highest increase in welfare. Depending on the
timing of the costs and benefits, a project may also have more than one IRR (see 3.2).
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In these cases where we have projects with a clear distinction in time
between the costs and the benefits, and the environmental effects occur in
the long run, we can clearly conc1ude that a lower discount rate implies an
environmentally better project selection. A lower rate values future
environmental costs or benefits higher, increasing the social profitability of
environmental conservation.
3.2 An investment project with negative environmental effects
In this section we shall look at a somewhat different type of project than
above.9 The project requires some initial investments to produce some
development benefits (DB), but the production of these benefits also have
some unwanted environmental costs (EC). The initial investment costs are
unit y . We may think of a hydro power development project. The benefits
are the energy produced, and the costs, in addition to the investment costs,
are the destrction of a wildemess area that produces environmental goods
like recreational services. Consider first the case where the benefits and
costs remain constant over time. The net present value is
(3.2) NPV:: -1 + /oot=o (DBt - ECt) e-it dt = -1 + DB/i - EC/i
We note that also in this case we get a unique relationship between the
NPV and i: The higher the discount rate is, the lower is the NPV. The
criterion for acceptance of the project (NPV )o O) is i ~ DB - EC.
But in this case implementation of the project will increase environmental
. degradation. Lowering the discount rate will have the opposite effect on the
environment compared to 3.1. Thus, forthis type of project, the argument
that a lower discount rate preserves the environment does not hold:
Environmental degradation is linked to new investments. A lower discount
rate would make more investments socially profitable, and increase
environmental destrction.10
A key point in Porter (1982) is that the development benefits are likely
to decrease over time, whereas the environmental costs or preservation
9 The discussion is based on Porter (1982).
10 The question of which discount rate to apply for assessments of new hydro power
developments has been a big issue in Norway. Some have argued that the rate should
be lower than the normal 7 per cent used for public projects, for example 5 per cent.
Many environmental groups have, together with economists, defended the use of the
"high" rate of 7 per cent.
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benefits, are increasing over time. 
u Let ECt be the environmental costs or
preservation benefits at time t, and a be the exponential growth rate of
these costs: ECt = ECellt. DBt is the development benefits at time t, and ß
the rate at which the benefits are declining over time: DBt = DBe-ßL.
When we introduce the changes over time in the development benefits
and environmental costs, we get
(3.3) NPV = - 1 + DB/(i+a) - EC/(i-ß)
In this case, there may be no unique relationship between the NPV and i.
This is illustrated in fig. 3.1. For high discount rates the project will not
pass the NPV -criterion because the initial costs are toa high compared to
the future (highly discounted) benefits. The project may also fail for
sufficiently low rates. This is due to the exponentially growing
environmental costs (or benefits of preservation). At the same time, the
development benefits are declining, so they cannot outweigh the costs.
Thus, there is an interval of discount rates for which the project may be
socially profitable.12
Related to the environmental critique discussed in chapter 2, we note that
the expected increase in the environmental costs has exactly the same effect
as a reduced discount rate for these costs. By proper evaluation, takng into
account that environmental costs (preservation benefits) are likely to
increase over time, the CBA may meet the environmental critique raised
against discounting. This illustrates an important point, viz. that (1) the
shadow prices and (2) the discount rate used in CBA cannot be looked at
in isolation. (See Sandmo (1983) for a more general discussion.)
11 "A fundaental asymmetry is perceived in these time paths. Development ofwildemess
is seen as the extraction or production of physical product which exhaustion or techncal
advanee wil probably render less valuable as time passes. Wildemess preservation, on
the other hand, is seen as the provision of services with - by the nature of wildemess
_ a quite inelastic supply curve that is shifting steadily inward as a result of
encroachment and congestion" (Porter, 1982, p. 61). In addition, the benefits of
preservation are likely to increase as environmental goods are likely to be income-elastic
and tastes seem to change in favour of increased appreciation of pure and clean
environments.
12 The shape of the curve is dependent on DB, Ee, a and ß. Aneeessar condition for the
pattem shown in fig. 3.2 is that .fDB :: .fEC + .fCa+ß). This is also aneeessar, but not
sufficient condition to get NPV :: O, and therefore the most interesting case. See Porter
(1982) for furter discussion.
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Fig. 3.1
The net present value (NPV) at different discount rates for an investment
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We can conclude that in the case of investment projects with negative
environmental effects which remain constant over time, a lowering of the
discount rate may increase environmental degradation. If we assume the
environmental costs to dec line and the development benefits to increase
over time, the effect may be ambiguous. For low levels of the discount rate
a lowering of the rate wiU prornote environmental conservation, whereas
the effect is the opposite for higher leveIs.
3.3Extraction of resources
The basic proposition in the theory of exhaustible resources, derived from
the Hotelling rule, is that a reduction in the discount rate leads to greater
conservation of the resources. The resource rent from extraction grows at
a rate equal to the rate of disco unt. A higher discount rate implies, ceteris
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paribus, a more rapid rise in the price path, which entails lower prices and
more rapid extraction in the early periods. "The economic case for rapid
development and exploitation of our mineral and fossil fuel resources is
enhanced by the use of a high disco unt rate. This is because the higher the
discount rate, the lower the value that the resources will have if left for
future development" (Lind, 1982, p. 7. See also Dasguptaand Heal, 1979,
and Dasgupta, 1982a, for a discussion of this effect.)
There may be situations where ths basic rule does not hold. Farzin
(1985), basing his arguments on an analytical discussion, and Stollery
(1990), using a simulation approach, argue that this proposition is not
generally valid. Farzin shows that the relationship between the discount rate
and the rate of resource depletion depends on the capital requirements for
both the production of the substitute and the extraction of the resource, as
well as the size of the resource stock. A reduction in the discount rate
brings about two counteracting effects: "A reduction acts to postpone the
use of resources to the future (a conservation effect), and second, ..., it
lowers the unit costs in both the substitute and resource sectors and hence
induces a faster rate of depletion (a disinvestment effect)" (p. 847). Re
notes that this latter effect has been completely neglected in the literature.
The depletion of the resource may increase when the discount rate is
lowered either when the resource stock is very low, or when the stock is
sufficiently high. For large resource stocks, the price will be determined by
the marginal co st of production as with ordinar products. A reduction in
the disco unt rate renders the resource cheaper, and increases its use. One
may argue that from an environmentalists point of view, the case with
large resource stocks left is not the most interesting one. Rowever, one may
get the same effect with a lower discount rate for sufficiently low stoeks.
The argument goes as follows: "When the stock of the resource is very
small, the resource can en joy a scarcity rent almost as large as the
difference between the cost of producing the substitute and its own
extraction cost, implying that it will command a price roughly equal to the
production cost of the substitute. In this case, a reduction in the interest rate
reduces the cost of the substitute, and hence the price obtainable by the
resource, leading to a faster use of the resource" (Farzin, 1985, p. 850).
This case may be paricularly relevant for economies with poor natural
resource endowments.
Stollery uses a simulation model to analyze the effect of changes in the
discount rate on the extraction of coal and copper. Re finds that for the
realistie range of rates the discount effect is more or less neutralon the
optimal rate of extraction. Re also notes that for low discount rates the
traditional result tends to hold, while the higher the disco unt rate, the more
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probable it is that the disinvestment effect will dominate over the
conservation effect. For the two minerals Stollery studied, the switch point
is at rates between 9 and 10 per cent.
In the case of renewable resources, like fisheries and forests, the
arguments are similar to the ones for exhaustible resources. A sustainable
use of renewable resources requires that the rate of haresting do not
exceed the biological rate of growth or natural regeneration. However, "it
is possible, if the discount rate rises above the maximum biological growth
rate of the stock, that, under certain conditions, the resources wiii be
depleted and extinguished altogether" (Pearce et al, 1989, p. 144, see also
the standard reference on the subject - Clark, 1976).
Whether a discount rate higher than the biological growth rate leads to
a depletion of resources, depends, inter aUa, on the cost strcture of the
haresting. if the costs of fishing the last fish or cutting the last trees are
sufficiently high, the resources will not be depleted. Renewable resources
may also serve important ecological functions. For instance, forests provide
flood-protection for agricultural production. if these extemal effects of
cutting trees are inc1uded in the cost-benefit analysis, a discount rate higher
than the natural regeneration may still not produce an economic justification
for a rate of haresting higher than the biological growth rate of trees.
The main conc1usion in the literature is that a higher discount rate wiii
lead to lower stocks of renewable resources. if the rate is above the
biological growth rate, the stock may be lower than the one producing the
maximum sustainable yield (MSY). In extreme cases, where the marginal
cost curve is relatively flat and there are small negative external effects13,
the resource may be extinguished altogether. However, also when it comes
to renewable resources, one may have a disinvestment effect which makes
the relationship in some cases ambiguous.
3.4 Investment leve L and economic activity
Besides determining the composition of the optimal investment package, the
discount rate also influences the optimallevel of total investments. A lower
rate wiii let more investment projects pass the NPV -criterion. Thus, high
rates wiii "slow down the general pace of development through the
depressing effects on investment. ... the demand for natural resources is
generally less with high discount rates than with lower ones" (Markandya
and Pearce, 1988, p. 3).
13 Alternatively, the extemal effects are large, but appear far ¡nto the future.
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The argument that economic growth has adverse effects on the
environment is frequently us ed by environmentalists. This is a complex
issue, but historically economic growth has lead to both increased use of
natural resources, as well as increased waste production. This should clearly
be the first order effect. On the other hand, the Brundtland-commission
(WCED, 1987) argues that poverty in the developing countres is in itself
contributing to unsustainable development, and that economic growth may
contribute to the solution of environmental probIerns.
Technical progress is c10sely linked to new investments. Some argue that
economic growth though a high level of investments may more than
outweigh the negative environmental impacts that economic growth in itself
may have. Whether this view is correct or not, is an empircal question.
Historically there is liUle evidence to support this position, though the
correlation between economic growth and environmental deterioration is far
from stable.
In a perfeet, first-best economy, the level of investments is determined
by the discount rate. However, particularly for developing countries, other
factors may be more important, e.g. the availability of capitaL. If the capital
constraint is the critical one, then the effects on "the general pace of
development" will be insignificant following a change in the discount rate.
3.5 Overall impact of discounting
While it is clear, by definition, that discounting in itself discriminates
against the future, the effects of lower disco unt rates are ambiguous,
contrar to popular beliefs. For some types of projects, e.g. investments in
purification systems, where there are initial investment costs, and long term
pay-offs in terms of increased delivery of environmental services, a lower
discount rate would increase the probability for projects to pass the NPV-
test. Some may argue that this represents the most interesting case when it
comes to environmental problems.
For other types of investment projects, where there are (long term)
negative environmental effects of the generation of (short term) benefits, the
effects of a lower rate is not clear. It depends on the change in the
environmental costs and development benefits over time, as well as the
level of the discount rate itself. Again, one may argue that in the interesting
interval of discount rates the impact is less environmental deterioration, but
this requires further empirical investigation. If the change in the benefits
and costs over time is small, then projects with negative environmental
effects are more likely to be accepted at lower discount rates than at higher
ones.
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Regarding extraction of resources, the effect may also be ambiguous,
even though the general proposition of a positive relationship between the
level of the discount rate and environmental degradation may hold. The
disinvestment effect should in any case not be overlooked, either the effect
on the composition of projects selected or on the overall investment leveL.
A tentative conclusion would be that the environmental effects of
discounting are ambiguous, but that the net effect of a lower discount rate
is likely to be positive for the environmental quality. This deserves two
remarks. First, the overall goal of a cost-benefit analysis is not to select
projects with the lowest environmental impacts. The core of the problem
is to flnd the optimal balance between increased consumption and
environmental conservation, or more generally: to find the optimal
combination of the varous services provided by the environment. Second,
the question still remains whether adjusting the discount rate is the most
appropriate way to deal with the negative environmental effects in a cost-
benefit analysis. The ambiguous relationship between the level of the
discount rate and environmental degradation already suggests that this
would not be a very precise means if one wants to put more emphasis on
environmental conservation.
4 Theoretical arguments for discounting
4.1 The social rate of time preference
A discussion of the arguments for discounting raises several problems. The
literature is anything but clear, and there exists liule consensus on the
subject. Different theories lead to different conclusions, and the positions
are hard to compare as the assumptions and approaches differ considerably.
According to Dixon and Meister (1986, p. 41), discounting is "one of the
most misunderstood concepts in economic analysis". Two decades earlier,
Baumol (1968, p. 788) similarly noted that "few topics in our discipline
rival the social rate of discount as a subject exhibiting simultaneously a
very considerable degree of knowledge and a very substantial level of
ignorance". In the theoreticalliterature, complex mo dels are developed to
find the appropriate rate, whereas in practical situations one flnds rather
pragmatic judgements. The issue of discounting also involves questions of
intergenerational justice and equity. This raises more fundamental questions
on the philosophical basis of welfare economics.
The discussion here is in no way a complete survey of the approaches
found in the literature. We have selected a few approaches that may provide
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auseful framework for the issues we want to highlight. In a subsequent
section, we also discuss a few more fundamental problems on the rationale
for pure time preference.
The first par of the discussion is based on the framework us ed in Social
Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA) (LittIe and Mirrlees, 1974; Squire and van
der Tak, 1975; Ray, 1984; Pedersen, 1988; Fjeldstad, 1989; Brent,
1990).14 Compared to traditional CBA, this approach pays explicit
attention to the distrbutional impacts of a project, and how consumption
changes for different groups are to be valued. This approach allows for an
explicit discussion of both the inter- and intragenerational distribution
within the same framework. Indeed, many of the same considerations that
apply to the distrbution issue at a parcular point in time, also apply to the
distribution between individuals over time. We will limit ourselves to a
discussion of the intergenerational issue, which is the most relevant one for
this paper.15
Our staring point is the objective of economic policy - to maximize the
welfare of the society. This is represented by a dynamic social welfare
function (W), which is simply the discounted value of the welfare in each
period (Wt). The discount rate is the rate of pure time preference (p),
assuming p :: O.
(4.1) W = fooo Wt e-pt dt
According to the Bergson-Samuelson welfare function, Wt is a function of
the individual utilities in each period. As we are not interested in the
distrbution within each period, we introduce a representative consumer
with an utility function, U(Ct). This makes Wt a function of only ms
14 The model used in 4.1 has a much wider use that just in SCBA, paricularly in optimal
growth models. Its roots go back to Eckstein (1957).15 The intragenerational distrbution may, however, also be relevant. For most projects with
substantial environmental effects the costs and benefits are asymmetrcally distributed:
The costs may be bome by one group of people, whereas the benefits are enjoyed by
another. In many cases in poor countries, the costs of environmental degradation are
bome by the rural and poor people, whereas arieher, of ten urban, elite are reaping the
benefits. The environmental degradation has not only an important aspect of
intergenerational distribution, but also of distribution withn the present generation.
SCBA, which gives higher social weights to a $1 extra to the poor than to the rich, wil
in these cases giv e higher weight to the negative environmental effects. U sing the SCBA
instead of the traditional CHA wil, therefore, contribute to better environmental
performance of public policy.
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consumption in period t (Ci).16 For additional simplicity, we use a function
which is constant over time and with constant elasticity of marginal utility.
(4.2) Wt = U(CJ = (l-nr1 ctn, for n "# 1, n ~ O
InCt, for n = 1
The marginal utility, Le. the increase in period t welfare due to one extra
unit of consumption in period t is
(4.3) Wte = Ue = Ct-n
n is the elasticity of the marginal utility or welfare of consumption.17 This
is a key parameter in the discussion, and is also at the centre of the SCBA,
both for the inter- and intragenerational issues. n = O implies that the
welfare increase of one dollar extra income to the consumer is the same
regardless of his initial consumption, Le. whether he is rich or poor. There
is no weighting of consumption increases with respect to the consumer' s
level of utility . For the intragenerational case, this corresponds to the
traditional cost-benefit approach.18
Any n ~ O indicates a preference for a more equal distrbution of income,
and the higher n is, the stronger are the preference. Paricularly, one should
note the case where n = 1 - the Bemoulli case. Then the welfare value of
a given consumption increase for an individual will be inversely
proportonal with his consumption leveL. The value of one dollar to an
individual with an income of $ 100 is worth 10 times more than the same
increase to someone with an income of $ 1 000.
Using (4.1) and (4.3), we can now find the (discounted) welfare effect of
a marginal increase in the consumption in period t.
(4.4) Wet = Ct-n e-PI
16 One problem discussed in the literature, with little consensus, is the specification of the
welfare function and its implication for the social rate of discount when the population
is growing. This is particularly relevant to developing countries. Our specification
ignores the size of the population that exists at any point in time. See for example
Layard (1972), Dasgupta (1982) and Brent (1990) for a discussion.
17 The elasticity of the marginal welfare or utilty of consumption is: Ucc (C¡Uc) = ~nC-D-l
ei eiD = n.
18 The use of distrbutional weights in CHA is a controversial issue, see particularly Ray
(1984) for an argument in favour of including distrbutional impacts in the analysis, and
Harberger (1971, 1979) for the opposite view.
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The consumption rate of interest (CRI) is defined as the rate at which the
marginal welfare of consumption (WcJ falls over time:
(4.5) CRI = - (dWct /dt) / Wct
From (4.4) and (4.5) we obtain19
(4.6) CRI = i = ng + p
g is the growth rate of consumption (for our representative consumer), and
we assume that g ~ O, Le. we expect some economic growth. The CR! or
i is the social rate of time preference, and also the social rate of discount
in this modeL. 20
According to (4.6) we have two basic reasons for discounting. First, we
place less weight on future increases in consumption simply because our
representative consumer has become richer. Because n is assumed to be
positive, an increase in the consumption of a rich consumer entails lesser
increase in welfare than the same increase to a poor consurner. Discounting
is necessar to avoid a redistribution of income from a present generation
that is relatively poor to a relatively rich one in the future.
This reason for discounting is parallel to the one used when discussing
intragenerational distrbution in SCBA. The discussion on inter- and intra-
generational distrbution is closely linked - both are related to our
preferences for consumption increases to the poor. We should paricularly
note that strong preferences for a more equal distribution among individuals
today (high n), also implies a strong preference for consumption now rather
than in future periods. The reason is simply that if we generally give a
relatively high value to consumption increases to the poor, the poor in an
intergenerational perspective, is the present generation, not the future ones
(as long as g is positive).
19 The derivation of the CRI-formula in more detuils goes as follows:
~dWcJdt = pCI-n e-Pi + nCI-n-1 e-Pi (dei Idt) = Ci-n e-Pi (p + nC;l (dCi/dt))
Inserting this and (4.4) into (4.5) produces
CRI = (Ci-n e-Pi (p + nCI-t (deildt))) I (Ci-n e-Pi) = p + n Ci-t (dCi/dt)
Jf we define g = (dCt/dt)/Ct, we get (4.6).
20 A discount rate is generally defined as the decline in a varable over time. This section
may ilustrate the importanee of the choice of numeraire for the level of the discount
rate. In the formulation in (4.1) welfare was used as the numeraire, and the
correspondig discount rate was the pure time preference. (4.6) gives the appropriate rate
of discount when we use consumption of a representative consumer in each period as
our numeraire.
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The second reason for discounting is the pure time preference. p ~ O
implies that we have some impatience, and would prefer early consumption
to later consumption, even if the consumption level is the same. We shall
return to a discussion of this concept in 4.3.
The advantage of this framework is that it separates the issue of
diminishing marginal utility and (pure) time preference. Olson and Bailey
(1981) "strongly suggest that "positive time preference" be defined to
exclude the effects of a difference in marginal utility due to any lower level
of consumption in the present and, therefore, to inc1ude only the preference
for present over future consumption due to other causes" (p. 5).
Unfortunately, the concepts are not uniformly used in the literature. In the
following, we will use the term "pure time preference" when referrng to
"p", and 44social time preference" to inc1ude both the pure time preference
and the effects of diminishing marginal utility. This will correspond to the
term used by in the literature on which we are basing the discussion.
We have summarzed the different cases from formula (4.6) in table 4.1.
We have assumed diminishing marginal utility (n ~ O) and a non-negative
pure time preference (p ~ O), which should be generally acceptable.
Table 4.1
Different cases of CRI (CRI=i=ng+p)
p~O p=O







We see that the distinction between diminishing marginal utility and pure
time preference is important. A positive rate of discount does not imply
positive time preference. Moreover, the case for negative discount rates can
only be justified within this framework if we expect negative growth,
sufficiently high to outweigh a possible positive pure time preference.
There is nothing within this framework that suggests that environmental
considerations should lead to a lower discount rate generally or for certain
costs/benefits, per se. There may, however, be arguments from the
environmental debate that could indirectly influence the level of the
discount rate. First, the rationale for discounting due to pure time
preference has been questioned (4.3). Further, it is also suggested that
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increased environmental problems either will, or should, lower economic
growth, which implies a lower g. if this is correct, then the existence of
environmental problems should lower the expectations for future growth,
and according to our model also lead to a lower social rate of discount.
4.2 The social rate of discount and the private capital rate of
re turn
In the previous section we found two arguments for discounting: Pure time
preference and diminishing marginal utility of consumption. A thid
commonly us ed argument for discounting is the existence of a positive rate
of return on investments in the private sector, or capital productivity. It has
also been argued that this rate or a weighted average of CRI and the private
return, is the appropriate social rate of disco unt.
The argument for considering the rate of return in the private sector is
that this represents the opportunity cost of funds used in public projects.
Using a rate lower than the private sector's would approve public projects
in cases where resources could have been allocated to private sector
investments with higher yield. On the other hand, according to the social
time preference, the society is willing to allocate resources to the future,
using a discount rate lower than the private sector rate of return. This
contradiction is the focus of Baumol (1968), who regrets that "no optimal
rate exists. The rate that satisfies one requirement cannot possibly meet the
conditions of the other" (p. 798).21
We should note that in our formulation of the maximation problem in
(4.1), it is only the stream of consumption that counts. Investment - both
public and private - is simply a means of transformng potential
consumption in one period to another period, and it is only this way that
it influences our valuation of a project. In comparng one situation with,
and another without the project, we need only to compare the streams of
consumption in the two situations, or actually only their present values. If
all the effects of a paricular project have been translated into consumption
changes at every point in time, the framework used in 4.1 should be the
correct one, and the social rate of time preference is the discount rate to be
used.
The problem, however, is that we normally do not trace all the effects
into changes in consumption. Usually only the direct effects of a project are
21 In a perfeet, first-best economy the rate of retum on private investments would be the
same as the consumption rate of interest.
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considered, and there is little reason to assume proportonality between the
direct effects and the total effects on consumption. A public project will,
typically, change both private consumption and investment. In its first
investment period the project is likely to have som e crowding out effects
on private investments, whereas the benefits produced in the following
years may increase investments. These changes in private investments in
turn change the consumption pattem over time. Because of the difficulty of
determining all these effects and trans form everything into consumption
streams, the practical procedure has been to look at the direct effects, Le.
to add up both consumption and investment effects. This means that we
have to change the numeraie used in CBA, which generally also implies
changing the discount rate.
The literature suggests some ways out of the dilemma noted by BaumoL.
Within the tradition following Arrow's (1966) work, the solution is to make
the optimization problem explicit, including the constraints facing the
governent. The problem is formulated in relation to optimal economic
growth. The selection of the discount rate is a par of this problem, and an
outcome of the solution. Thus, the optimal rate will generally depend on,
inter aUa, the source of financing and the macroeconomic policy in general.
This also implies that the discount rate should differ between projects.
Another solution to this apparent dilemma has been developed by
Bradford (1975). He assumes a sec ond-best world, where the government
is restrcted in its investment opportunities in the way that investment in the
private sector is not an option. "Because of such restrictions, apparently
attractive returns in the private sector may not represent opportunity costs
for the government, or at least not directly. ... private rates of return
become irelevant to governent choices" (p. 888). However, the private
rates of return play an indirect role in the assessment of public projects, as
will be clear later. We shall briefly present the model developed by
Bradford, see also Lind (1982) and Hagen (1983). This allows us to
separate consideration of (1) the social time preference, and (2) the effects
of public projects on private investment (the private sector rate of return).
We consider a public investment project, with all costs incurrng in
period t and all benefits in period t+ 1. Bradford extends his analysis to
public investments with multiperiod returns, but this does not add any
fundamental insight to the problem.22 The important point is that we also
include effects on private sector consumption and investment after period
t+1, caused by the project costs (period 1) and benefits (period t+1).
22 Compared to Bradford's model, we have for simplification also assumed all the variables
to be time-independent.
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The investment costs are $1 in period t. The project yields its entire
output $(1 +Jl) in period t+ 1. Jl is the rate of return on public investments.
Let a be the decrease in private investments due to a $1 increase in public
investments costs, making (l-a) the loss in private consumption in period
t.23 Further, we define v as the social value or shadow price of private
investments, Le. the discounted value, using the social rate of time
preference (i), of all the consumption changes due to a $1 change on
private capitaL. Thus, the present value of the decrease in private
investments is av, making the total consumption loss (l-a+av), valued in
period t consumption units.
The benefit of the project, an output of (l +Jl) in period t+ 1, causes an
increase in the consumption in period t+ 1 of (l-a)(l +Jl), where a is the
increase in private investments due to a $1 increase in the output in the
public sector, and (l-a) the equivalent increase in private consumption. The
increase in private investments causes, indirectly, a change in the
consumption in all future periods. The value of this increase is (1 +Jl)av.
Discounting to period t values, the total benefits of the project are
((1 +Jl)/(l +i)) (l-a+av). The net present value of the project then becomes
(4.7) NPV = -(1-a+av) + ((1+Jl)/(l+i)) (l-a+av)
The NPV is positive if and only if
(4.8) (1+Jl) / (l+i) ~ (l-a(v-1)) / (l+a(v-1))
This formula determines the rate of return, Jl, that is required to make the
project profitable. Generally, the critical rate is a function of i, a, a and v.
We are now looking at some different cases corresponding to varous
assumptions about the parameters.
23 We assure full employment of resources, implying that all resources used in the public
sector are drawn from the private in al: 1 relationship. This may be an unrealistic
assumption for many developing countries, paricularly in cases where the unemployment
rates are 30~40 per cent. Jf the costs of a public project do not reduce the private
consumption and investment with the same amount, it is c1ear that the required rate of
retum wiU be lower for the project to pass the NPV -test. Thus, if public projects are able
to mobilze unutilzed resources, the requirement on the rate of retum should be lowered.
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Case A: a=a=O
This is the simple st case where the public project does not affect private
investments at alL. The direct effects on private consumption equal the total
effects. The appropriate rate to use is the social time preference. This may
be an extreme case, but is a point of reference and has parallels to the
model discussed in 4.1.
In a discussion of the implications of the increased international mobility
of capital on the disco unt rate, Lind (1990) argues that the effects of a
public project on private investments may be insignificant. This indicates
that this case may be realistie in the presence of a high degree of capital
mobility.
Case B: a=a
This more general case says that there is some symmetr in the way costs
and benefits affect private investments: $1 cost and $1 output causes the
same change in private capital formation. This case may be arealistic one,
for example if the "revenue is raised by direct taxation of consurner citizens
and in which the implicit income from the government project is treated
exactly like ordinar, after-tax, income" (Bradford, 1975, p. 890).
From the formula in (4.8), we easily see that the acceptance condition
simply becomes Il ~ i, i.e. the project should be accepted as long as the
marginal rate of return exceeds the social time preference rate. This is a
rather remarkable result, and, as Bradford notes, "the surprising aspect of
this case is that the rate of return in the private sector, sometimes called the
opportunity cost of funds, does not enter the equation at all" (p. 891).
Case C: a=l, a=O
In this case, all the resources used as inputs in the project are drawn from
private investments, whereas the entire output goes to increased
consumption directly and does not affect the private capital formation.
Bradford notes that "these assumptions ... are often made, at least
implicitly" (p. 891). The condition for a positive NPV is now:
(4.9) (1+Il)/(1+i) ~ v
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v is realistically a number greater than 1.24 The required yield is therefore
greater than the social time preference. Bradford further shows that given
that v, i, r and the rate of saving are constant, this requires that the rate of
rçturn on the public project must also be higher than the private rate of
return. The reason is that "the governent project does not generate the
favourable repercussions on future capital formation which the private
investment does" (p. 891).
Case D: a=O, a=l
This is the opposite of case C: All the resources are drawn from
consumption, and the yield converted into private capitaL. The condition for
NPV ~ O becomes
(4.10) (1+~)/(l+i) ~ liv
In this case, the required rate of retum will be lower than the social time
preference, because the government in this case generates favourable
repercussions on private capital formation.
Case E: The two-period mode!: a=O
U sing a two-period model, letting the sec ond period represent the future,
has been a common method to analyze the question of discounting. A two-
period analysis means that there is no investment in the sec ond period, i.e.
a=O. One unit of forgone capital in period t gives a reduction in
consumption in period t+ 1 of (1 +r) units. The social value of private capital
then simply becomes v = (1 +r)/(l +i). This produces the following
conditions for the required rate of retum:
(4.11) ~ ~ (l-a)i + ar
To be accepted, the rate of return of the public investment must exceed the
weighted average of the social time preference and the rate of return on
private capital. The weights are the proportions in which the resources are
being drawn from consumption and investments in the private sector. (4.11)
24 Bradford finds v to be in the range of 0.96 to 1. i 9 under a realistie range for the values
of the parameters.
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is perhaps the most common recommendation in the literature on how the
social rate of discount should be determned, see for example Sandmo and
Drèze (1971), who use two-period models to arve at this formula.
In this framework the two-period model and the consequent
recommendation is just a special case, with the rather unrealistic
assumption of no future capital formation consequences of changes in either
government or private investment. In general, as we have seen, the
appropriate rate may lie even outside the borders of the social time
preference rate and the private rate of return. This conclusion is also
derived by Stiglitz (1982), who uses a somewhat different approach.
The optimal discount rate for the public sector is based on opportunity-
cost reasoning. The profitability of a public project should be determined
on the basis of the alternative uses of the resources, thus the attention to the
uses from where the resources are taken, and where the outputs are going.
If we adopt the approach outlined above, there will be no single social rate
of discount, but different rates for different projects. The rates may even
differ for the same project depending on how it is financed and the state of
the economy when it is implemented.
There are considerable problems in estimating the effects of a public
project necessary to calculate the optimal social rate of discount. Thus, we
have good reasons to consider some sensible rules of the thumb. Bradford
suggests to use the social rate of time preference, Le. that case B is a
realistic one. a=ex is known as the Arrow-Kurz assumption. Lind's (1982)
advice is to use an approach in which "we adjust benefits and costs at each
point in time so that they are expressed in terms of consumption
equivalents, which can appropriately bediscounted using the social rate of
time preference" (p. 44), as we have outlined in 4.1. Re argues that this
method does not require more information than the other one.
Row can the environmental debate be fitted into this framework? We
have an argument for using a discount rate lower than the social rate of
time preference if (and only if) a.( ex. Projects where the investment costs
have small crowding out effects on private investments (low a), and where
the benefits generated stimulate private investments in the future (high ex)
should be discounted at a lower rate.
Based on the above discussion, it seems difficult to find a general
argument for using a lower discount rate on projects with large
environmental consequences. Consider, for example, an investment in a
purification system that will produce a better environmental quality in a
recreational area, i.e. increase the consumption of recreational goods. In this
case it is likely that ex will be small (and a ~ ex). Thus, we have an argument
for using a discount rate higher than the social time preference. On the
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other hand, consider a purification project that c1eans up waste that is a
(negative) input in another production proeess. It is more likely that a -c ex
in this case, and we may have an argument for a rate lower than i. Thus,
it seems difficult to find any general arguments within this model that
favour the use of a lower discount rate for projects with large
environmental effects.
4.3 Should positive pure time preference be aUowed to injuence
the social disco unt rate?
We have seen in the previous sections that there are good arguments for
using the social rate of time preference as the social rate of discount, even
if we calculate the effects directly. In the case where all effects are
transformed to consumption equivalents, it is obvious that this is the rate
to be used. We shall now focus on the pure time preference, which is the
argument for discounting that does not originate in diminishing marginal
utility.
In economic textbooks, a positive time preference is often referred to as
just "impatience" or "pure myopia". If a consumer has the option of getting
a cake today or tomorrow, he would prefer getting it today. Myopia may
be regarded as just a par of human nature; "as a brute fact about human
psychology, this seems undeniable" (Goodin, 1982, p. 54).
An argument for "the case for positive time preference is absolutely
compelling" is given by Olson and Bailey (1981), to be referred to as O-B.
Their starng point is a consumer who maximizes his intertemporal utility ,
given the budget constraint. The utility function for our representative
consumer is similar to the welfare function presented in 4.1. We assume
that the consumer is not constrained in the credit market, and he is free to
borrow or save at the same rate of interest (r).
The major outcome of this optimization problem is well known from the
more general intertemporal theory of the consumer behaviour. Using our
specification of the welfare function (4.2), optimization implies
(4.12) Ct-n/Co-n = ept/e\ t = l,... 00
If we assurne, for simplicity that n = 1, we get
(4.13) Cr/Ct = ept/er\ t = 1,... 00
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This simple formula generates a number of interesting results. First, we
note that a necessar condition for constant consumption over time (Ct =
Co) is that the rate of interest equals the rate of time preference (r = p).
Second, if r ~ p, which may be fair to assume, then we get increasing
consumption over time. The retum on putting money in the bank is higher
than the pure time preference, so the consurner is better off doing so. But
because of diminishing marginal utility he will reach a point where the gain
of increased future consumption through more savings/investments is not
compensated for by the sacrifice of present consumption.
Let us now consider the implications of the case of zero time preference,
and a positive rate of interest. When expanding the time horizon to infinity,
we get from (4.13)
(4.14) lim Co/CT = O
T~oo
According to this model, a zero time preference and an infinite time
horizon imply that the consurner will reduce his present consumption level
to zero.25 This result may be somewhat surprising, and O-B "doubt that
the proponents of a zero time preference and an infinite time horizon have
understood the implications of their argument" (p. 13). The quest for
intergenerational justice is not solved by zero time preference. A stable
level of consumption implies, as noted earlier, that r = p.
What happ ens if we replace the infinite time horizon with a finite one in
the consumers problem? "Truncating a decision maker's time horizon can
(...) only strengthen the evidence for a positive time preference, since it
merely involves attrbuting zero value, rather than a discounted, but positive
value, to any consumption after a certain date" (p. 14). In general, the case
for positive time preference gets stronger as the time horizon gets shorter.
Commenting on the environmental debate, O-B hold that "those who
advocate certain environmental and resource policies on the ground that the
interests of all future years and generations ought to be weighted equally
with our concern for utility in the present, are contradicted by their own
behaviour" (p. 3).
This result contradicts another result in economic theory, showed
originally by Strotz (1956) and also discussed by Krutilla and Fisher
(1975): Individual pure time preference is not necessarilyconsistent with
25 As Q-B point out, this is given that "the C; attainable under the budget constrait is
below the satiation level" (p. 12), that is where the marginal utilty is zero. In our
formulation of the utilty function, this possibilty is excluded.
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lifetime welfare maximization. Consider an individual who makes a plan
for his present and future consumption, based on lifetime utility
maximation. Would he, when reconsidering his plan at later dates, obey or
disobey his original plan? Strotz shows that the original plan will generally
not be obeyed, even if all his original expectations about the future are
verified. Due to his pure time preference, he will get a "spendthrift". At
any point in time, he will spend more than he should according to his
previous plan.
Strotz notes that this may be parcularly relevant for consumers with low
income - they spend "too much" now because of high pure time
preference. High individual time preference in developing countres seems
to be areasonable explanation of high individual discount rates. When
people are poor, and live in a more unstable environment, the risk and
uncertainty about the future is higher, including the risk of death. Thus,
poverty may to some extent also give a rational justification for the
individuals to use high discount rates. Still, this cannot fully explain why
poor people seem to have higher individual discount rates.26
Then the question now arses: Should irrational individual preferences
be allowed to determine a social decision rule as the discount rate? Several
authors have been reluctant to accept "consumer sovereignty" in this case:
... irrationality may dictate very high social discount rates with a
corresponding small legacy of capita for future generations. That
discount rate may therefore be incompatible with som e other value
judgements being used. Moreover, the very construction of consumer
demand theory is based on assumptions which rule out irrational
preferences (e.g. preferences which would permit indifference curves
to intersect). Why then suddenly take a moral stance which says that
this irrationality wil be permitted when calculating a discount rate?
(Pearce and Nash, 1981, p. 154).
Sen (1961) states that "in so far as the "pure" discount arses merely due
to irrationality, its use in a choice that aims at being "rational" is
unjustifiable" (p. 482). Goodin (1982) puts it this way: "There is no more
reason for public policy to reflect this disability than there is for it to reflect
26 U sing a model of individual behaviour in the purehase and utilzation of energy-using
durables, Hausman (1979) finds that the discount rate vares inversely with income in
the United States. The estimated rates vary from 89 per cent for the lowest income dass
($ 6 (0) to 5.1 per cent for the highest ($ 50 (0). This is a surprisingly huge range,
and the result has parallels in the comparson between rich and poor countries.
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people's inc ap acit y to think rationally about large numbers or to perform
fancy arthmetic" (pp. 54-55). Strotz himself concludes that "consumer
sovereignty has no meaning in the context of the dynamic decision-makng
problem" (p. 179).
Markandya and Pearce (1988) are also sceptical to this, and illustrate
their point with a situation where high disco unt rates cause environmental
degradation, and at the same time upoor prospects arsing from
environmental degradation actually assist in generating the poverty that
'causes' high discount rates" (p. 35). They argue that using these rates
would be wrong: "if high personal time preference rates are allowed to
influence the value of i (social time preference rate), the implication may
therefore be that the discount rate unjustly reflects constrained activity , a
situation where individuals are unable to act in normal economic and
environmental framework" (p. 35). Their suggestion is to lower the pure
time preference rate in the contexts where the environment-poverty linkages
are strong, Le. to use as the reference point a "normal" situation which the
policy is aiming for.
A sec ond argument that is used to explain why people have a positive
time preference is uncertainty about the future. This risk and uncertainty
can be divided into three groups (Markandya and Pearce, 1988, and Pearce
and Turner, 1990):
(1) Risk of death, Le. uncertainty about the presence of the individual.
(2) Uncertainty about future preferences.
(3) Uncertainty about future benefits and costs.
The "risk of death argument" may be entirely rational from an individual
who is risk averse.27 The risk of death leads to higher individual discount
rates, Le. more consumption now and less later. This general view is not
fully agreed upon by Olson and Bailey (1981). They conclude their
discussion on the effects of uncertainty claiming that it "may reduce the
expected apparent rate of return on saving, yet at the same time in the
absenee of universal futures and insurance markets it can increase the
'need or incentive for saving, that is, its prospective utility". In summar,
the "risk of death" and the "save for a rainy day" arguments point in
different directions, and, therefore, the effects of uncertainty on the time
preference are ambiguous.
27 Eckstein (1961, quoted in Pearce and Nash, 1981) has calculated such rates for US and
India, and deri ved values of 0.4 and 2.15 per cent respectively for the 40-44 age groups.
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Assuming that the risk of death increases the time preference, the
question again arses if "it is illegitimate to derive implications for
potentially immortal societies from risks faced by mortal individuals"
(Markandya and Pearce, 1988, p. 31). Even though this is rational from the
individual standpoint, it seems irrational for the society as a whole to base
its policy guidelines on the fact that "in the long run we are all dead".
The two other types of uncertainty may be highly relevant in the case of
projects with large environmental impacts, and we will return to a
discussion of these issues in chapter 5.2. In conclusion, there are strong
arguments for the existence of positive individual pure time preference. But
this is pary based on irrational behaviour (myopia), and parlyon
individual mortality and other types of individual uncertainty. The
individual arguments for pure time preference are high ly questionable when
it comes to their influence on the determination of the social rate of
discount.
Before completing our discussion on the relationship between individual
preferences and the social rate of discount, we shall briefly review the
arguments discussed by paricularly A. Sen on why these two rates should
differ. Sen (1982) uses three arguments for applying a social rate of
discount lower than the private one: (1) The "isolation paradox"; (2) the
dual-role argument; and (3) the super-responsibility argument.
The isolation argument or "isolation paradox" goes back to Sen (1961)
and Marglin (1963), the latter using the term "interdependence argument".
This is just a special instanee of a very general problem, namely the non-
zero-sum game, known as the "prisoner's dilemma" in the two-person case
(Sen, 1967). Consider an individual that faces the choice of how much to
consume now and how mue h to save (invest). The return on his saving will
depend positivelyon how much is being saved by others, Le. there exist
positive external effects. The outcome of all the individuals acting in
isolation will be that the total saving is toa low. However, it is possible to
make everybody better off by undertaking more investments collectively
than each finds desirable to undertake privately. The reasons for such
externalties may be e.g. higher individual risk of a project than the risk
imposed on society, and the public good character of investments (Baumol,
1968).
The dual-role argument rests on the assertion that we as individuals play
different Toles, one as a market actor taking decisions concernng our own
consumption, savings etc., the other role being as an actor in a public
decision process. "The Economic Man and the Citizen are for all intents
and purposes two different individuals" (Marglin, 1963, p. 98). According
to this view, the relevant social rate of discount should not be based on
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market rates of interest, but rather as the outcome of a political process, Le.
where the individuals act as Citizens. Generally , it is also reasonable to
assume that an individual giv es higher weight to future generations in his
public role. The "impatience" and the "risk of death" arguments discussed
earlier may be viewed as examples of the judgements people exercise in
their role of the "Economic Man". In their "Citizen" role, however, they
may more be hesitant to let their own mortty determine their judgments
in public affairs. It may, however, be difficult to distinguish between the
isolation argument and the dual-role argument. Some of the opinions
expressed in public may be in their self interest only if they are collectively
agreed upon.
An argument against using the individual's public role for determining
the social rate of disco unt is that, since we have two different sets of
preferences, only one of them can be tre. "Since deeds speak louder than
words, one can argue that preferences revealed in the market place are more
genuine and better considered" (Marglin, 1963, p. 99)~ If one accepts that
the nature of decisions are fundamentally different in the two situations,
Marglin ' s argument is not convincing.
The third argument favouring a lower social rate of disco unt is the super
responsibility role of the state or the authoritaran or paternalistic argument.
The state is viewed as an entity with objectives separate from and
independent of its individual citizens. The state is a guardian of national
interests and future generations, and these go beyond the interests and
preferences of the individuals.28 This argument is related to another one,
namely that it is the satisfaction of wants as they arse that matters. "W e
are interested in tomorrow's satisfaction as such, not today' sassessment of
tomorrow' s satisfaction" (Sen, 1957, p. 746). This raises deeper
philosophical issues, and questions whether the underlying value judgement
in CBA is properly expressed.
4.4 Should the social discount rate be lowered?
Assuming that a lower discount rate promotes environmental conservation,
should the discount rate be lowered to include environmental concern? In
28 This line of argument goes back to Pigou (1932). Re argued that the state should be a
guardian of interests of future generations as well as the interests of the present one.
Thus, the state should use a lower rate of discount in its decisions than the individual
citizens do, in order to give more weight to future generations. According to Pigou,
social welfare is not only a function of the utility of present members of society, but also
of the utilty of all future members.
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this respect, it is crucial to distinguish between two separate lines of
critique: (1) The fact that a project has environmental effects should imply
a lower discount rate, and (2) the discount rates presently in use are toa
high.
Our conc1usion on the first question is that the presence of large
environmental impacts does not, per se, prov ide any arguments for a lower
discount rate for the parcular project. This has also general support in the
economic literature(see Cooper, 1981, Lind, 1982, Markandya and Pearce,
1988, Pearce et al, 1989). These effects would better be handled in ways
described in the next chapters.
Indirectly, there may be arguments for adj u sting the discount rate in the
presenee of large environmental effects. Estimates of the social rate of
discount according to the formula in (4.6) are of ten based on the past
performance of the economy, Le. the past growth rate in consumption.
Some environmentalists argue that future growth will be lower due to
increased environmental problems and constraints. This is a basic
proposition in the "Limits to Growth" argument: Finite stoeks of natural
resources and limited renovation capacity willlower the rate of economic
growth.29 Increasing resource scarcity would therefore, indirectly, imply
lowering the social rate of discount.30
As discussed in section 4.2, we have an argument for using a discount
rate lower than the rate of social time preference if a general characteristic
of public projects with large future environmental consequences is that the
investment resources are mainly drawn from consumption, whereas the
benefits mainly generate higher private investments. It seems difficult to
assume such a characteristic for "environmental" projects. In fact, one could
argue that for a typical project the benefits are mainly consumed, whereas
the costs today draw resources from other private investments. In any case,
to assume such general characteristic seems speculative.
The environmental debate has (again) questioned the validity of
individual pure time preferences as a factor determining the social rate of
discount. Is positive pure time preference morally defensible? Is it
legitimate for the government to reexamine (the consistency of) individual
29 Declining per capita consumption has been the situation for a number of developing
countres in paricularly Sub~Saharan Africa over the past two decades. This trend is
parly caused be deteriorating environmental conditions.
30 Interestingly, the same conclusion may be derived from other approaehes. For Instance,
Moxnes (1989) asks which discount rate would ensure sustainable development, and
concludes that the discount rate wil be fallng over time due to increasing resource
constraints on economIc activity.
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preferences? The influence of individual pure time preference on the social
rate of discount is paricularly questionable when it comes to decisions that
may have large consequences for the well..being of future generations.
Regarding the second question raised on whether the presently used rates
generally are toa high, it requires a study on its own. Our remarks are
limited to some observations on the differences in the underlying arguments
behind those rates being used, compared to the discussion in this chapter.
As shown, it may be hard to justify some of the arguments normally used
for high discount rates. This concems the opportunity cost in the private
sector. The influence of the private return on the social rate of discount is,
as showed in section 4.2, dependent on whether it is the direct effects of
the project or the total consumption effects that enter the calculation. In the
latter case the private retum should have no influence on the social rate of
disco unt. Further, and may be more important, the use of pure time
preference as a reason for discounting was questioned.
There is one strong argument for discounting, viz. the diminishing
marginal utility of consumption. This raises the question of what the
elasticity of the marginal utility (n) should be, as well as the (expected) rate
of growth in consumption. The Bernoulli-case (n=l) seems to be widely
used, but in general n will var with both the income level of the countr
concerned31 and the society's (govemment's) preferences for a more equal
distrbution. If one takes the critique against pure time preference seriously,
and assumes that n= 1, we would ar ve at social discount rates that equal
the rate of growth of consumption. This would, indeed, give discount rates
much lower than those presently used.
Several authors have also criticized the level of the discount rates.
Cooper (1981) comments on this question in the following way:
After all, economics has not been able to offer any empirical evidence on
the social rate of discount. For the most part, discount rates reflect value-
judgements made by planners. They are no doubt influenced by 'fashion';
it is comforting to know that one is discounting at a rate which is
reasonably dose to the rates that other people have used. They are
probably also influenced by market rates of interest, even though there is
not much reason to suppose that market rates reflect sodal time
preferences. The ' conservatism' that leads to the use of social rates of
31 For developing countres, one can argue that for consumption levels near the leve! of
survival, the marginal utilty beomes very high. Thus, we may have an arguent for
higher n, the poorer people are. This is to say that people value consumption now as
they are very poor much higher than later consumption when they have become richer
(less poor).
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disco unt which are lower that the market rates of interest, but not by 'too
much' has little basis in logic (p. 99).
He further states that "there are arguments to support the idea that "normal"
discount rates (say from 5-10 per cent) are toa high", and that one of the
reasons may be that planners base their judgements on individual
preferences and do not tae account of the "isolation paradox" . Cooper is
also referring to the argument that the very fact that people are concerned
about long-run environmental costs "may in itself be taken to show that
people' s concems about costs and benefits to future generations are more
considerable than discount rates actually used would suggest" (p. 99). This
argument has some relevance, but the curent environmental concem should
better be interpreted as an indication that many people want a change in
policy. Then, the next question is to find the best way to accommodate this
concern in the project and policy appraisal methods.
Lind (1982) argues that the level of the rates commonly used today,
namely "a discount rate of 10 per cent in constant dollars will (if 10 per
cent is above the social rate of time preference) lead to a systematic
underestirnation of the costs of government programmes that involve
current consumption, and will incorrectly bias the analysis against
government expenditure that will produce benefits that will flow back into
the economy in the future" . This bias will not be present in the approach
suggested, which "provides us with a conceptual basis for correctly
ca1culating the opportunity cost for all public expenditure programs, not just
public investments" (p. 55).
Berlage and Renard (1985) and Brent (1990) also discuss the conceptual
basis for the discount rate, paricularly when applied to projects in
developing countries. Their argument is that the rates presently used by
international agencies like the World Bank are toa high. The following
passage between Little and Mirrlees, the authors of the standard manual on
"Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries" illustrates that
pragmatic considerations have played a major role. Little explained: "... I
said to Professor Mirrlees that we should find a way of producing an
interest rate that the World Bank would believe. They always want 10 per
cent or more, and most economists have been talking in terms of a social
discount rate of more like 4 or 5 per cent. The World Bank would not flnd
that credible. So the answer was to change the numeraire" (quoted in
Berlage and Renard, 1985, p. 691).32
32 Little and Mirrlees (1974) and Squire and van der Tak (1975) use uncommitted foreign
exchange in the hands of govemments as the numeraire in their analysis, not
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5 Expanding the traditional CHA
This chapter briefly reviews some of the extensions of the traditional CBA
that have been suggested in order to take proper account of a project s
environmental effects. These techniques have, by and large, be en developed
during the last two decades. Theyare well founded in economic theory, but
raise, however, significant problems of estimation and practical
implementation.
There are usually four different types of values attached to the
environment:
(1) Use value refers to the economic value deri ved from using the
environment inone way or another;
(2) Option value, which may be defined as a risk premium when there is
uncertainty of future demand and/or supply of environmental services.
(3) Quasi-option value, which is the value of preserving options, when
decisions are irreversible, future costs and benefits uncertain and the
information on the costs and benefits increases over time.
(4) Existence value, Le. the value of just knowing that something exists.
Our emphasis will be on risk and uncertainty, which is an important aspect
in the assessment of future environmental effects. The existence of risk and
uncertainty may also give an argument for adjusting the discount rate. First,
we shall briefly review some of the general problems in the valuation of
environmental goods.
5.1 Valuation of environmental effects
One of the fast growing areas within economic theory over the past few
years has been within the development of methods for valuation of
environmental goods. CBA is generally concerned with the effects of a
project on people' s welfare. As the services provided by the environment
are important for human welfare, efforts tring to value the environmental
effects are c1early justified theoretically.
The environmental effects of a project can be divided into different
groups:
consumption (at the average level), as for example UNIDO (1972) and others do. In
principle, the choice of numeraire should not affect the result of the CHA. In practice,
however, it may do. See Berlage and Renard (1985) for a discussion.
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(1) Changes in the environment that affect the production of market goods,
as environmental resources are being used in the production process.
(2) Changes in the environment that affect the consumption of
environmental goods, like recreational facilities and amenities.
(3) Changes in the environment that affect human well-being directly, like
health.33
For all these categories a valuation of the environmental effects consists of
several steps: First, one should find out the physical changes caused by the
project. Second, these changes will have certain ecological consequences.
Further, these ecological changes have socio-economic consequences, to
which we should assign values. The first two (and parly three) steps are
normally left to the natural scientists, but even non-professionals can
imagine that already at this stage we may face big troubles. Thus,
economists have to rely on the natural scientists' uncertain estimates. "The
economic analyst lives rather high on the information food chain" (Randall,
1986, p. 95).
As for the first group of projects, the valuation of the changes in
produetion should be relatively easy. This raises no parcular difficulty
compared to the other components of a CBA, except that the knowledge on
future changes of the environment due to the project will be limited and
uncertain. For developing countres, the environmental effects in the first
group may prove to be the most important (for example lower agricultural
productivity due to soil erosion, deforestation, etc.).
The economic research on evaluation of environmental goods has been
concentrated on projects in groups 2 and 3. One major problem related to
the measurement of environmental goods, is the public goods attrbutes of
them. This prec1udes the development of well functioning markets. There
are two commonly suggested solutions to this problem: (1) The indirect
methods, including hedonic pricing and travel cost approaches, try to reveal
the value of environmental goods from observed behaviour in other
markets. (2) Direct methods of measurement, inc1uding contingent valuation
and policy decision makng mechanisms, which attempt to reveal preference
by asking people. One advantage with the latter methods is that it inc1udes
all types of values (see above), whereas the indirect methods only may
reveal the use value.34
33 Changes in health may also indirectly affect the production, as it lowers the quality of
the human re source input into the production proeess.
34 For those interested, surveys ofvaluationmethods are provided by, among others, Strand
(1982),Freeman (1985),Johansson (1987),Nash and Bowers (1988) and Bergstrom (1990).
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Even though the methodologies have been developed extensively, and
have also been used in policy making, parcularly in the United States,
Nash and Bowers (1988) conc1ude their discussion somewhat more
pessimistically:
we are far from a situation in which reliable money valuation can be
placed on environmental effects and the normal practice in cost-benefit
analysis is either to ignore environmenta factors or to use a mixture of
quantitative and qualitative descriptions in non-monetay terms. Where
irreversible effects of uncertain consequences are involved, it appears that
all the literature can do is to wam that a positive benefit/cost ratio does
not necessarly mean that the project should go ahead. In these
circumstances, cost-benefit analysis should only be used subject to
predetermined environmenta constraints (p. 118).
Generally , the problems of estimation and quantification seem to be larger
for developing countries. This is due to several factors: The data and
information available are usually less reliable than in developed countres.
Markets are generally less developed or even lacking. This makes it
difficult to use market prices as a staring point for social value. For this
reason, indirect methods of revealing preferences for environmental goods
are less relevant. Methods for direct measurement of the preferences for
environmental goods also raise additional problems, e.g. reliable answers
require some training in thinking in monetar terms. People may be (even
more) unfamiliar and hesitant to put a price on environmental goods. In a
survey on valuation of environmental impacts in Indonesia, Barbier (1988)
concludes that willingness-to-pay surveys have limited applications. This
makes the argument for supplementar methods (chapter 6) stronger when
it comes to developing countres.
5.2 Risk and uncertainty
As already noted, our knowledge of the value attached to environmental
changes is imperfect. Generally , it seems fair to assume that the uncertainty
related to environmental impacts are greater than for other impacts.
Quantification of this value involves a number of uncertain steps (see
above), of which we have limited previous experience. The fact that many
of the changes occur far into the future adds new dimensions to the
problem. And, as just noted, there are major difficulties in making reliable
monetar estimates on ecological changes.
In the proeess of quantification, one may distinguish between two kinds
of uncertainty: (1) Technical uncertainties, because of imperfect knowledge
34
about ecological changes, and (2) social uncertainty, because of imperfect
knowledge about how society will value these changes.
Economic theory suggests methods to handle risk and uncertainty. The
general rule is that, due to risk aversion, a situation with a certain income
is preferable to another situation with an uncertain, but the same expected
income. In the latter case one can denne a certainty equivalent, which is
defined as the certain income that a priori would give a person the same
utility as the uncertain one. Because of risk aversion, the certainty
equivalent is lower than the expected income in the uncertain case.
Individuals act as if they maximise their expected utility, not their expected
income.
Rowever, for public projects it is possible to diminish the significance of
individual risk-averseness if the risk can be shared. According to the
Arrow-Lind theorem,
when the risks associated with a public investment are publicly borne, the
tota cost of risk bearng is insignificant, and, therefore, the government
should ignore uncertanty in evaluating public investments. Similarly, the
choice of rate of discount should in this case be independent of
considerations of risk. This res ult is obtained not because the government
is able to pool investments but because the government distributes the risk
associated with any investment among a large number of people. It is the
risk spreading aspect of the government investment that is essential to this
result (Arrow and Lind, 1970, p. 366).
The crucial question is whether the assumptions underlying the theorem
hold, Le. whether the governent can share the risk between a large
number of individuals or whether the project is non-marginaL. If this is not
the case, the expected utility theory also has implications for the social
value of costs and benefits. In a reply to the Arrow-Lind aricle, Fisher
(1973) discusses the validity of the theorem to projects with large
environmental costs. Re argues that environmental risk may well not be
spread in the manner required by the theorem. Some individuals may face
a significant risk due to the project. And risk may not easily (costlessly) be
transferred from the affected individuals to the larger community. Fisher's
conclusion is that in some cases "the environmental effects of an
investment project may well be large enough to make the adjustment (of
risk) appropriate" (p. 724). Similarly, Anand and Nalebuff (1987) note that
project risk is not borne equally across the population. Even though the
government in principle could correct these consequences, they suggest that
"without strong evidence to the contrar, it is safer to assume that the
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government policy will remain unchanged" (p. 200). Thus, the practical
relevanee of the Arow-Lind theorem is controversial.
If there is a failure to spread risk, we should take the risk occurng to
a group of individuals into account in the analysis. Using expected values
in project appraisal may lead to an underestimation of the environmental
costs involved, and consequently a level of environmental damage in excess
of what is socially optimal. The gap between the expected net benefit and
the expected value will depend positivelyon the proportion of damage cost
relative to the income of individuals, the risk averseness of the population,
and the varance of the net benefit. 35
There are two suggestions on how to adjust for risk in CBA: The first is
to adjust the costs and benefits by using certainty equivalents, the second
is to adjust the discount rate. There is some scepticism against using the
discount rate. "Uncertainty about the presenee and scale of benefits and
costs may be unrelated to time, and certainly appears unlikely to be related
in such away that the scale of risk obeys an exponential function as is
implied in the use of a single rate in the discount factor" (Markandya and
Pearce, 1988, p. 32). Their suggestion is that risk and uncertainty are better
handled by other means, Le. via adjustments of the costs and benefits using
certainty equivalents.
The more recent literature, paricularly on the "capital asset pricing
model" (CAPM), points out that it is not the risk (varance) of a single
project, but rather of the portfolio of an individual's projects, or, for the
society, the national income that is of interest. Jf the risk of a public project
can be effectively distributed, a single project should be assessed as to
whether it increases or decreases the risk of the total portfolio, Le. the
interesting measure is not so much the varance but the covariance between
the project and the portfolio. This is put c1early by Lind (1982, p. 60):
Many consider any investment that has uncertain return to be risky. They
would be right if that investment were the only one in an individual's
portfolio, or from the national point of view, if that investment produced
a major fraction of the national income. However, from the point of view
of an individual, one is not primarily interested in the varabilty of the
return on a single particular investment but, rather, the variabilty of the
return on the tota portfolio of assets that produces one's income. From
a national point of view, the variabilty of total income is of interest. One
is interested only in the variabilty of any single component of a portfolio
35 The individual' s certain equivalent (CE) is approximately determned by ths formula:
CE = EV - Ro/2, where EV is the expected value of the net benefit, R is the absolute
risk aversion and O2 is the varianee of the net benefit.
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insofar as it affects the variabilty of the total portfolio. The recognition
of this fact is central to the analysis of risk.
A public project will involve some risk for the nation if it has a positive
covarance with the national income. if, on the other hand, the covarance
is negative, this paricular project has the character of an insurance: The
project performs well when the economy performs poorly, and vice versa,
and it will stabilize the totallevel of national income. When the covarance
is negative, the discount rate should be lowered.
How are projects with large environmental effects correlated with the
returns of the other projects in the economy? We have not seen any
systematic discussion of the topic. The covarance will obviously var
among different types of projects, according to the type of environmental
impact it represents. One may find arguments for considering environmental
preservation as a kind of insurance. if this is the case, we have an argument
for adjusting the CBA procedure in away which may lower the chances for
a project with negative impact being accepted. It seems speculative to state
that this is a general characteristic, and the question of covarance should
be assessed for each individual project.36
5.3 Uncertainty, irreversibility, option va lue and quasi-option
va lue
We shall continue the discussion of risk and uncertainty, but now under
some additional assumptions on the nature of the problem. First, we assume
that the project involves some irreversible transformation of the
environment. In defining themeaning of irreversibility, we follow Henr
(1974): "A decision is considered irreversible if it significantly reduces for
a long time the varety of choices that would be possible in the future" (p.
1006). Technical ireversibility seems relatively rare, but is relevant where
for instanee development involves extinction of indigenous species.
Economic irreversibility seems much more common, Le. the costs of
reversing the development are so high that for practical purposes the project
can be considered irreversible.
The second assumption is that there are uncertainties about the future
benefits and costs from the project, and that we will obtain more
knowledge in the future that will reduce this uncertainty. if we are keeping
36 The adjustment of the discount rate also depends on how the problem is formulated, see
Brown (1983) and Prince (1985).
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open the option whether or not to develop for example a wildemess area,
we will accumulate more knowledge about the consequences of our choice,
and, therefore, be in a position to make better-informed choices later.
Our problem now is to find the optimal development of the wildemess
area, given that any development is irreversible, the present uncertainty
about future preservation and development benefits, and that more will be
leamed about these benefits in the future. For simplicity we assume that the
agents are risk neutral. But even if we do not ass urne risk averseness,
"something of the "feel" of risk aversion is produced by a restriction on
reversibility" (Arow and Fisher, 1974, p. 318).
The sol uti on of this problem goes back to the work of Henr (1974),
Arow and Fisher (1974) and Fisher and Krtilla (1975). They introduce the
term option value, which is "the gain from being able to leam about future
benefits that would be precluded by development if one do es not develop
initially - the gain from retaining the option to preserve or develop in the
future" (Fisher and Krutilla, 1985, p. 185).
An intuitive interpretation of the main result is given in Arrow and Fisher
(1974): "If we are uncertain about the payoff to investment in development,
we should err on the side of underinvestment, rather than overinvestment,
since development is irreversible. Given an ability to leam from experience,
underinvestment can be remedied before the sec ond period, whereas
mistaken overinvestment cannot, the consequences persisting in effect for
all time" (p. 317).
One should note that the literature is somewhat confusing on the
terminolog y used in this context. The term "option value" goes back to
Weisbrod (1964). In the work that followed his article, it was established
that the option value could be identified with a risk premium that risk
averse people would be willing to pay to avoid the uncertainty associated
with future benefits. This interpretation of option value is obviously a
different one compared to the one referred to above.
It has become common to use the term quasi-option value for the latter
(see for example Randall, 1986, and Dixon et al, 1986), even though for
instance Fisher and Krtilla (1985) do not follow this terminology, and use
option value in both cases, which they, however, clearly distinguish. We
shall follow the more recent terminology, and reserve the term option value
for the risk premium associated with future uncertainty. This assurnes risk
aversion, and is what we discussed in the previous section. The term quasi-
option value will be used for the value of delaying the decision and
preserving options, given the expected growth in information.
The quasi-option value is closely related to the value of new information,
but Fisher and Krutilla (1985) distinguish between the quasi-option value
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and the value of information. The quasi-option value is "a conditional value
of information, conditional on a paricular choice of first period
development", Le. no development in the first period (p. 186).
The quasi-option value will be positive in most cases, as we usually will
lear more about both the preservation benefits as well as the development
benefits as time goes. In cases where development itself leads to better
information for future decisions, the quasi option value may be negative
(Mill er and Lad, 1984). In the general case it seems fair to assume a
positive value because the uncertainty is most likely linked to the
preservation benefits (Fisher and Haneman, 1987).
The quasi-option value associated with the preservation alternative will
generally make preservation more attractive. The irreversibility of a project
is not an argument for using a lower disco unt rate, but the quasi -option
value is a eost that we should attach to the development project - we are
losing forever a possibly beneficial preservation of the wilderness area. This
does not imply that irreversible projects should never be undertaken, but it
means that they have an extra cost that should enter the overall analysis of
the social profitability of the development project. U sing only the expected
values (based on present information) will lead to transformations of the
environment that are higher than socially optimal because it does not reflect
the loss of options it entails.
6 Introducing additional or alternative criteria
So far we have discussed two alternative ways of including environmental
considerations into CBA. A third and quite different type of adjustments of
the traditional CBA is to introduce additional or alternative criteria to the
CBA. Some would base this on a fundamental critique of the CBA. Some
of the arguments referred to earlier by Sen and Goodin can be interpreted
in this way. Others suggest the introduction of new criteria because a
correct CBA is very data- and resource demanding, and, in practice, very
difficult to undertake (Cooper, 1981). They may agree that, in principle, a
CBA that gives the environmental goods a proper measurement and takes
account of risk, uncertainty, ireversibility etc. may lead to a socially
correct decision. For practical purposes, where the CBA is supposed to
operate, one may need other criteria. We shaii discuss two suggestions in
this direction: Sustainability constraints and Safe Minimum Standards
(SMS).
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6.1 Sustainability constraints and shadow projects
The basic idea of CBA is to transform all cost and benefits, inc1uding the
environmental ones, to one common unit of measurement, namely the
present value in monetar units, and then select the project for
implementation if the benefits outweigh the costs. This assumes that all
benefits and costs can and should be measured by the same numeraire. The
idea behind introducing sustainability constraints and shadow projects is
based on the non-quantifiability of certn benefits and costs, either for
practical reasons or based on a more fundamental critique. This makes it
difficult to reach a conclusion about the social desirability of the project by
just comparng measurable benefits and costs. One alternative may be, as
of ten suggested, to quantify whatever can be quantified, and describe the
rest as best one can qualitatively, and leave it to the normal political
decision process to balance net quantifiable gains against qualitative costs.
Another approach may be to introduce a sustainability constraint on the
project selection. This is done by requiring that the sum of environmental
dam age of a package of projects should be non-positive. The idea is
summarzed by Klaassen and Brotterweg (1976), who introduced the
concept of shadow projects:
... if a project has adverse effects on the natural environment, these
disadvantages wil have to be compensated by executing shadow projects
simultaneously. As a result of this action however, the socio-economic
profitabilty of the basic project wil become lower than when there is no
need to car out shadow projects, because the costs of the shadow
projects have to be charged to the basic project (p. 40).
A project with negative environmental effects should be followed by
compensating (shadow) projects in such away that the total environmental
impact is non-negative. The selection among possible (combinations of)
shadow projects should, of course, minimize the costs. Pearce et al (1988)
and Markandya and Pearce (1988) extend the work of Klaassen and
Brotterweg, and suggest that this criterion may be most interesting at the
programme leve l, i.e. for a larger number of projects. They also distinguish
between two types of sustainability: (1) Weak sustainability, where the
constraint is that the present value of the environmental impacts shall be
non-positive; (2) Strong sustainability, where the impact shall be non-
positive for each period of time.
This approach raises two immediate questions. First, we have "the
problem of the non-interchangeability of shadow projects" (Klaassen and
Brotterweg, 1976, p. 41). Their suggestion is that the shadow project should
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be designed to replace the lost nature such that "the replacement resembles
the original as doselyas possible" (p. 41). In their view it will be possible
in practice to define suitable shadow projects. They go on defining different
categories of pollution (noise nuisance, ai pollution etc.), and indicate that
the shadow projects should compensate for negative effects within every
group. Ths suggestion is dose to the one on "non-tradables" in chapter 2.
Environmental degradation in one area cannot be compensated for by
improvements in another. Markandya and Pearce (1988) stress that the
sustainability constraint "is not a blind "replace a tree for every tree
removed" requirement. ... Rather it is an attempt to accommodate the
interests of future generations in a practical way by debiting projects or
programmes with the costs of the resource losses" (p. 54).
Some environmental impacts are irreversible in their nature (extinetion
of specìes, extraction of non-renewable resources). In these cases
compensating projects, per definition, cannot be designed. Projects that
result in the extinction of endangered species will be hard to justify
following this approach. In the case of non-renewable energy sources, the
main interest for mankind is the supply of energy, and a compensating
project could be designed to increase the availability of other energy
sources in the future.
The second question is whether every single (net) depreciation of the
environment should be prohibited. There may be cases wqere the
measurable social net gain is large, whereas the negative environmental
impact is relatively low, and the cost of a shadow projects very high.
Should one in these cases be allowed to trade measurable social gains
against natural quality? Klaassen and Botterweg's answer to this question
is that "only when it appears that neither avoidance nor replacement is
possible, will we be able to satisfy the basic requirement that nature must
not be spoiled any further. The question whether the project under
consideration is so urgent that it should be caried out in any case should
be answered within the framework of the democratic decision-makng
process" (p. 45).
6.2 Safe minimum standards (SMS)
The Safe Minimum Standard (SMS) approach differs from the sustainability
constraints in the way that it is more to be considered as an alternative
approach to CBA, paricularly relevant to questions involving irreversible
decìsions, e.g. preservation of endangered species. The SMS was developed
by Ciriacy-Wantrp (1968), and has later been extended by Bishop (1978).
SMS is defined as the minimum level of preservation of species that
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ensures survivaL. Plant and animal species are renewable withn limits, but
have a threshold or cri tie al zone. Once this zone is reached, furer
depletìon is ireversible. There is a lot of uncertainty associated with
irreversible depletion, and the term "safe" indicates that the SMS is a very
risk averse approach.
Bishop (1978) develops the SMS approach within the framework of game
theory, where the SMS giv e the same results as the minimax principle, Le.
the strategy that minimizes maximum possible losses. 37 Re considers two
possible outcomes of nature, one where the species turns out to be very
valuable, another where they do not. Society has two options; either
developing an area which will lead to extinction of certin species or




Strategies: Species not Species Maximum
valuable valuable losses
Development O y y
( =extinction)
Preservation x x-y x
x = net present value of development project
y = possible value of species
If the species turn out not to be of any value for society, then the SMS
strategy involves a loss of x, which is the net present value38 of the
development of a wilderness area (hydro power etc.). The species may also
turn out to be worth a large amount, symbolized by y. If we choose
development, and the species turn out to be valuable, y will be lost. Finally,
if the preservatìon strategy is chosen and the species turn out to be
valuable, the net loss will be the cost of non-development (x) minus the
37 This should not be confused with the minimax regret principle, where the ai is to
minimze the maxImum "regret", Le. the difference between the actual pay-off and the
pay-off received if the correct strategy had been chosen.
38 N otice that we do not avoid the discounting issue in this approach.
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value of the species (y). The maximum losses for each strategy is given in
the right column.
The minimax rule says that we should choose preservation if y ~ x, Le.
if the possible value of preservation is larger than the development benefits.
It is also generally assumed that species are of high and increasing value,
whereas the costs of preservation are usually low. Thus, in most cases y
would be higher than x and the minimax strateg y willlead to SMS.
One problem related to the assumptions in game theory and the minimax
principle, is that the value of the outeornes are known, whereas the
probabilities are unknown. If y is not known, then it is unclear which
strategy should be chosen. Moreover, it does not matter whether the
probabilities are known or not, they are irrelevant for what we should
choose. Suppose we have a situation where the x is slightly less than y, but
the estimated probability for the outcome that the species becomes valuable
is very low. Following blindly the minimax strategy, we should choose the
SMS, even though common sense would suggest the opposite. The reason
is that the minimax approach only con siders the extreme values, and do 
es
not utilize other types of information we may have about the problem.
Bishop also notes that there are several problems with this approach. He
introduces the modifed minimax principle: "Ths decision rule states that
the SMS should be adopted unless the social costs of doing so are
unacceptably large. How much is "unacceptably large" must necessarly
involve more than economic analysis, because endangered species involve
issues of intergenerational equity" (p. 10).
In comparng the CBA and the SMS approaches, Randall (1986) notes
the following differences between the two:
The BCA (CBA) approach starts each case with a dean slate and
painstaingly builds, from the ground up, a body of evidence about the
benefits and costs of preservation. The SMS approach stars with a
presumption that the maintenance of the SMS for any species is a positive
good. The empirical economic question is "Can we afford it?" or, more
technically, "How high are the opportunity costs of satisfying the SMS?"
The decision rule is to maintain the SMS unless the opportunity co st of
so doing are intolerably high. The burden of proof is assigned to the case
against maintaining the SMS.
The SMS approach avoids some of the pitfalls of formal BCA: e.g. the
treatment of gross uncertanty as mere risk, the false appearance of
precision in benefit estimation, and the problem of discounting. Its
weakess is that, rather than providing the answer, it redefines the
question. Nevertheless, an appealing argument can be made that "Can we
afford it?" with a presumption in favour of the SMS, unless the answer
is a resounding NO, it is the proper question (p. 98).
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The SMS approach is related to the "environmental rights" approach, as
discussed by Sen (1982). His main argument is to define certain
environmentallibertes or rights, that apply both to members of the present
and future generations.
7 Summary and conclusions
Two issues have been underlying the discussion in this paper. First, how
can environmental considerations be included in CBA, and what is the most
appropriate way of doing so? Second, which factors should determine, and
what is the "right" level of, the social discount rate?
Regarding the latter question, chapter 4 discussed the rationale behind
discounting, both at the individual and sociallevel. Decreasing marginal
utility of consumption together with expected economic growth clearly
provide an argument for discounting, which, in principle, should not be
controversial. But it raises questions about future economic growth. The
"Limits to Growth" view suggests that we are already approaching absolute
environmental constraints on economic activity , which make a continuation
of past growth rates impossible. Declining economic growth is clearly an
argument for using lower social rate of discounts.
The environmental issue involves questions of intergenerational
distribution and equity. The influence of pure time preference on the social
rate of discount is (even) more questionable when it comes to decisions
with large negative environmental consequences, that may significantly
influence the well-being of future generations. If we accept the critique of
pure time preference argument, and the "Limits to Growth" arguments, we
may arve at very low discount rates. If, for instance, we assume the
elasticity of marginal utility to be one (n== 1), and we allow no pure time
preference, the social discount rate would equal the growth in consumption.
This is, indeed, much lower than the rates presently used.
If we do not trace all the effects into consumption streams, the private
return may influence the social discount rate and make it different from the
consumption rate of interest, to the extent the displacement effect on private
capital formation of public projects is different from the enhancement
effect. If the latter effect is higher than the displacement effect, the discount
rate used should actually be lower than the consumption rate of interest. In
general, it seems difficult to argue that this would characterize projects with
large environmental impacts.
Another argument for adjusting the discount rate is the risk associated
with future costs and benefits. The most important point is how the return
of the project is correlated with other projects in the portfolio, or the
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national income from society' s point of view. If the correlation is negative,
Le. the project is a kind of insurance, the disco unt rate should be lowered
for this project. One may find arguments for this being the case for projects
with large environmental impacts, but it seems speculative to suggest a
negative correlation and a lower rate in general.
Whereas there are good arguments for the view that the presently used
rates are toa high, this is not to suggest that the fact that projects may have
environmental impacts should dictate lower discount rates. It would be
putting toa heavy a burden on the discount rate and would cause
inconsistency in other areas of the analysis. Moreover, as the discussion in
chapter 3 showed, this would not be a very precise measure to promote
environmental conservation. Indeed, the effect of agenerally lowered
discount rate would in many relevant cases not be increased preservation
of the environment.
We have discussed two alternative ways of bringing environmental
considerations into an economic assessment. Chapter 5 reviewed some of
the more recent extensions of CBA, pary originating as a response to the
environmental critique. First, the environmental effects should enter the
analysis, and one should take account of how the costs and benefits of a
project will develop over time (3.2). Second, the analysis should take
explicitly into account some of the characteristics of the environmental
effects: They are uncertain and of ten ireversible. Generally , these
extensions will contribute to a project selection and policy that imply less
transformations of the natural environment.
The extended CBA would in many situations prov ide useful insight in the
effects of a project, which may be crucial for the outcome of the analysis.
However, the extended CBA involves several probIerns. First, we cannot
place reliable money valuation on all environmental effects, so the CBA
will not be complete. This is paricularly true for impacts that are
associated with gre at risk and irreversibility, which are especially common
in developing countres. Second, there are unresolved methodological and
conceptual problems with the CBA approach. Finally, environmental issues
involve the question of distrbution between generations. Welfare
economics is generally ill-equipped with tools to deal with the aims of
distribution, even though it is very useful in finding means to reach pre-
determined distributional ends.
For these and othet9 reasons, we would suggest that the CBA approach
should be used subject to predetermined sustainability constraints. As
39 For a discussion of other reasons why the use of CBA is limited a basic public decision
rule, see Randall (1986, p. 92-94).
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Randall (1986) observes, this is the way CBA works in other areas as well:
"Rather than determinants, benefits and costs become mere considerations
in the choice from a set of alternatives which satisfy the basic law of the
land" (p. 93). Both the sustainability constraints and to some extent the
Safe Minimum Standard (SMS) are examples of such "laws".
The basic question still remains how the environmental or sustainability
constraints should be determined and specified. All methods of evaluation
involve comparsons of costs and benefits according to some scale of social
desirability. CBA makes this very explicit, which makes all the problems
of such comparsons more transparent, and, therefore, more open for
critique. To some extent the use of sustainability constraints and the
modified minimax principle (SMS) are just redefining the questions, rather
than providing the answers.
In the end, all methods are used as inputs in a decision process, and the
final decisions have to rely on this process, no matter how imperfect it may
be. This fact, together with the difficulties discussed, should perhaps make
us lower the ambition level when applying CBA to environmental issues.
It is pary the same realization that is behind Lind's statement on the
purpose of CBA.
Benefit..cost analysis need not and cannot provide precise answers to
policy questions. Rather it is a procedure that can provide a crude but
highly useful picture of the relative merits of alternative policies. It can
therefore be used to identify those investments that are either very good
or very bad. Benefit..cost analysis also organizes the date that bear on
policy decisions and does so in away that educates us about the importat
elements of a problem and allows us to test the sensitivity of the decisions
to changes of those elements (Lind, 1982, p. 24).
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